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Animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) have the potential to severely 
impact food animal production systems. Paradoxically, the collateral damage associ-
ated with the outbreak response may create a larger threat to the food supply, social 
stability, and economic viability of rural communities than the disease itself. When FMD 
occurs in domestic animals, most developed countries will implement strict movement 
controls in the area surrounding the infected farm(s). Historically, stopping all animal 
movements has been considered one of the most effective ways to control FMD and 
stop disease spread. However, stopping all movements in an area comes at a cost, 
as there are often uninfected herds and flocks within the control area. The inability to 
harvest uninfected animals and move their products to processing interrupts the food 
supply chain and has the potential to result in an enormous waste of safe, nutritious 
animal products, and create animal welfare situations. In addition, these adverse effects 
may negatively impact agriculture businesses and the related economy. Effective disease 
control measures and the security of the food supply thus require a balanced approach 
based on science and practicality. Evaluating the risks associated with the movement 
of live animals and products before an outbreak happens provides valuable insights for 
risk management plans. These plans can optimize animal and product movements while 
preventing disease spread. Food security benefits from emergency response plans that 
both control the disease and keep our food system functional. Therefore, emergency 
response plans must aim to minimize the unintended negative consequence to farmers, 
food processors, rural communities, and ultimately consumers.
Keywords: continuity of business, public–private partnership, risk assessments, permitted movements, foot-and-
mouth disease, animal disease, outbreak response, proactive risk assessment
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Outbreaks happen when the right host population meets the right 
infectious agent at the right time. When highly contagious animal 
diseases not currently found in a country or region are introduced 
into a naïve population, the result can be explosive spread. For 
this reason, the response to such a foreign animal disease (FAD) 
must be rapid and well-planned. Historically, response to highly 
a contagious FAD like foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) has 
focused on the eradication of the disease and a return to disease-
free status as rapidly as possible (1). This approach, commonly 
referred to as “stamping out,” requires the rapid identification 
of infected premises, quick depopulation and, for premises with 
susceptible species in the control area that are at risk for infection 
but not known to be infected, there are often quarantine and strict 
movement controls. The scenario in which there are uninfected 
but susceptible animals near infected premises is likely to occur 
and is a predicament for regulatory officials. Stopping all move-
ments of animals, products, and potential fomites from infected 
premises utilizing a stamping out approach is an obvious thing to 
do to control disease, but what does one do with not known to be 
infected herds and all of the food they produce?
Everyday there are food products and animals that move from 
farms in a “just in time” production system. If an FAD outbreak 
occurs, for those premises in a control area, the product and 
animal movements can add up quickly. The inability to harvest 
uninfected animals and move their products to further processing 
interrupts the food supply chain and has the potential to result in 
an enormous waste, adversely impact agricultural businesses, and 
create animal welfare situations. This was more fully recognized 
following the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom. Of 
the 6 million animals culled during the 2001 outbreak of FMD 
in the UK, an estimated one-third died under various types of 
“welfare cull” (2, 3). These 2 million animals represent the poten-
tially non-infected population that were killed due to the lack of 
a prepared response that includes continuity of business (COB) 
considerations for the permitted movement of non-infected 
animals and animal products. Furthermore, it is increasingly 
unacceptable globally to destroy large numbers of “healthy” or 
“non-infected” animals. Thus, current and future response plans 
should consider COB principles are part of the planning for an 
FAD response. COB planning is meant to prepare for animal 
health emergencies and to address what to do with premises and 
herds that are not known to be infected but may be adversely 
affected by disease response activities. COB planning tools and 
guidance can facilitate the managed movement of animals and 
their products.
Continuity of business principles have been adopted by the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal Health 
and Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) Veterinary Services (VS) 
and were used to guide the permitted movements of products in 
highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in 2015 and 2016. 
The stated goals of USDA APHIS VS for a FAD response (4) 
include COB principles:
The APHIS goals of an FAD response are to (1) detect, 
control, and contain the disease in animals as quickly as 
possible; (2) eradicate the disease using strategies that 
seek to stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, 
and the economy and that protect public health and the 
environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based 
approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of busi-
ness for non-infected animals and non-contaminated 
animal products.
Achieving these three goals will allow individual 
livestock facilities, States, Tribes, regions, and industries 
to resume normal production as quickly as possible. 
The objective is to allow the United States to regain 
disease-free status without the response effort causing 
more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak 
itself.
Once USDA APHIS VS adopted COB in principle, it became 
clear that tools were needed to guide the specific decisions that 
would balance product movement with outbreak control. To 
that end, a process was developed utilizing risk assessments 
performed proactively (i.e., before an outbreak happens) to 
develop and evaluate science-based guidelines and the associated 
risk of specific movements from premises located in control 
areas that are not known to be infected. These risk assessments, 
done before an epidemic occurs, also take into consideration the 
potential factors or strategies to mitigate risk that may be put in 
place during an outbreak. This proactive risk assessment process 
is a transparent and scientifically accepted method to evaluate 
commodity and disease specific pathways of transmission. 
Proactive risk assessments specifically identify pathways where 
risk exists and explore the necessary mitigations for reducing the 
risks. The results of the process can help determine the disease 
transmission risk of specific product movement and inform the 
responsible regulatory officials and industry stakeholders who are 
designing emergency preparedness and COB plans before an out-
break. Ultimately, the planning process will allow for informed 
decision-making regarding managed movement and the COB 
plan implementation during an outbreak.
The approach used to develop the proactive risk assessment 
utilizes a collaborative process involving state and federal 
regulatory officials, academia, and members of private industry 
(public–private partnerships) and follows the general risk analy-
sis framework that is presented in the OIE Terrestrial Animal 
Health Code (5). While the intention of the OIE framework is 
to prevent the entry of animal pathogens and evaluating the risk 
of susceptible animal exposure through the importation of live 
animals, animal products, and commodities into a country, the 
framework fits well for the situation of addressing risk of spread 
through movements within a control area.
Throughout this process, the input from the food animal 
industry is crucial as it helps to supply data to support the work 
and decide what potential mitigation strategies can be realisti-
cally adopted by the industry in the event of an FAD outbreak. 
State and federal regulators’ input is also important as they pro-
vide the procedures and policies for managed movement as well 
as the logistics to implement the emergency preparedness plans. 
The effect of proposed mitigations on existing risk pathways is 
evaluated and then used to inform the development of movement 
guidelines that can then become permitted movement guidance. 
Without development of proactive risk assessments, similar 
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decisions about movements would have to be made quickly 
during an outbreak and sometimes without a full understanding 
of risk. This is one of the main advantages of this approach. The 
collaborative, proactive approach makes it possible to compile 
the best available information, model scenarios, understand 
movement risks, and form mitigation strategies relevant to cur-
rent production practices. The mitigation strategies can then be 
put in place and the movements can occur all while following the 
prescribed regulatory structure. This allows COB to be included 
in preparedness planning and increases the adoption and aware-
ness of guidelines and tools pre-event.
The collaborative public–private partnership approach is 
thus a key component to the development of the proactive risk 
assessments. Just as they would need to work together in an out-
break, these sectors collaborate in developing the proactive risk 
assessments and guidelines for managed product movement for 
specific commodities. The process itself communicates findings 
to the collaborating groups and supports the development of net-
works of individuals that include public and private stakeholders. 
Regulators learn about food animal industry systems and practice 
while industry representatives learn about regulatory processes 
and requirements. This is a key part of the risk communication 
step of risk analysis.
Ultimately, the decision to allow managed movements in an 
outbreak from individual premises in an established control 
area will be the decision of the responsible regulatory official. 
The COB plans and guidance materials are practical and useable 
tools for decision makers. However, it is important to recognize 
that final decisions in an outbreak situation may have many 
other constraints like resource limitations, political restrictions, 
or biological considerations that have not been anticipated in the 
development of the risk assessment. Also, one of the main limita-
tions is that no one can know exactly what the next outbreak will 
look like. Although guidance documents can incorporate what 
is known from past outbreaks, biological agents have a way of 
acquiring novel characteristics and presenting themselves in new 
ways. For that reason, guidelines developed through this process 
to support COB are just that—guidelines—and not requirements. 
The judgment needed to balance disease control, and COB must 
be made in the context of the ongoing outbreak; this is the intense 
burden of the responsible regulatory officials.
In the end, outbreaks are expensive, time consuming, and a 
serious threat to food security and business. No one wants them 
to happen but when they do, the negative impacts on farmers, 
food processors, rural communities, and consumers can be 
lessened with planned responses that include the development of 
proactive COB guidelines. Regulatory requirements that stop the 
movement of all animals and animal-derived products may likely 
result in disease eradication but may just as likely have serious 
deleterious effects on the entire food supply chain. The develop-
ment of COB plans that simultaneously address the challenges 
of controlling an FAD outbreak, maintaining the supply of food 
to the consumer, and ensuring the viability of the food industry 
represent an important step in FAD response.
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